中文摘要
我们研究旨在彻底改革退休融资（作为税收与转移支付体系有机组成部分）的帕累托最优政策改革。我们的政策分析框架是一个异质性主体世代交叠模型，该模型在匹配美国经济的总量与分布特征方面表现良好。我们提出了一种帕累托最优性检验，以识别现状政策中无效率的主要来源。我们的检验表明，当年金市场不完备时，晚年缺乏资产补贴是无效率的主要来源。我们求解帕累托最优政策改革，并表明累进式资产补贴为帕累托最优改革提供了有力工具。另一方面，劳动收入税改革并不总能带来效率增益。我们在一个具有人口结构变化的经济体中实施了我们的帕累托最优政策改革。在稳态下，该改革将各代消费的净资源折现值减少了约7%至11%。这些收益相当于向初始世代提供的一次性总量转移支付，等于GDP的10.5%。
Abstract
We study Pareto optimal policy reforms aimed at overhauling retirement financing as an integral part of the tax and transfer system. Our framework for policy analysis is a heterogeneous‐agent overlapping‐generations model that performs well in matching the aggregate and distributional features of the U.S. economy. We present a test of Pareto optimality that identifies the main source of inefficiency in the status quo policies. Our test suggests that lack of asset subsidies late in life is the main source of inefficiency when annuity markets are incomplete. We solve for Pareto optimal policy reforms and show that progressive asset subsidies provide a powerful tool for Pareto optimal reforms. On the other hand, earnings tax reforms do not always yield efficiency gains. We implement our Pareto optimal policy reform in an economy that features demographic change. The reform reduces the present discounted value of net resources consumed by each generation by about 7 to 11 percent in the steady state. These gains amount to a one‐time lump‐sum transfer to the initial generation equal to 10.5 percent of GDP.