A Farewell to Arms: Paramilitaries Demobilization, Political Competition and Public Goods in Colombia
中文摘要
学者们强调了地方精英如何能利用其事实上的权力俘获民主。这使得在由政治驱动的武装冲突中，选举竞争尤为脆弱。地方精英所实施的政治动机暴力若减少，是否会促进选举竞争？为探究这一问题，我在哥伦比亚准军事组织复员的背景下采用合成双重差分策略，这些准军事组织与全国各地的当地精英有着密切的联系。在复员之后，我观察到竞争有所加剧。我表明，这种竞争的改善与镇压性暴力的减少相一致，从而使那些在未发生复员的情况下可能沦为暴力受害者的政党更有可能获得选举候选人资格。然而，我也发现，与精英相关联的政党增加了其选举存在，显示出其为弥补复员带来的损失而做出的努力。最后，我提供证据表明，在先前由准军事组织控制的地区，公共品投资发生了一种转变，如今惠及更广泛的人群，我认为这在一定程度上可由竞争的加剧来解释。
Abstract
Scholars have highlighted how local elites can use their de facto power to capture democracy. This makes electoral competition particularly vulnerable in armed conflicts driven by politics. Would a reduction in politically motivated violence perpetrated by local elites promote electoral competition? To investigate this, I employ a synthetic difference-in-differences strategy within the setting of Colombia’s demobilization of paramilitaries, who were heavily connected with local elites across the country. Following demobilization, I observe an increase in competition. I show that this improvement in competition is consistent with a decrease in repressive violence, leading to an increased likelihood of electoral candidacy for parties that would have potentially been victims of violence in the absence of demobilization. However, I also find that parties associated with elites increased their electoral presence, showing an effort to compensate for the loss produced by demobilization. Finally, I present evidence that public goods investment in territories previously controlled by paramilitaries undergoes a transformation, now benefiting a broader sector of the population, which I argue is partly explained by the increased competition.