在小企业间配置劳动力：关于信息约束的实验证据

中文摘要

我们记录了加纳小企业主对劳动力重新配置的兴趣；分别有 60% 和 41% 的人自我报告愿意雇用当地普通企业主或为其工作。在一次贝克尔—德格鲁特—马沙克（Becker–DeGroot–Marschak）竞价实验中，企业主还表现出对随机抽取的部分招聘企业及求职企业主信息的较高支付意愿。获取此类信息的条件随机的变动，会在企业内和企业间产生即时的劳动力调整，尽管很少涉及企业主本人，并在干预后 5 个月影响企业关闭。我们的发现表明，此类劳动力市场信息在我们的情境中既有价值又可付诸行动。

Abstract

We document interest in labor reallocation among small firm owners in Ghana; 60% and 41%, respectively, self-report willingness to hire or work for the average local firm owner. Firm owners also exhibit high willingness-to-pay for information on a random subset of hiring firms and jobseeking firm owners during a Becker–Degroot–Marschak exercise. Conditionally random variation in access to this information generates immediate labor adjustments within and between firms, though rarely of firm owners themselves, and impacts firm closure 5-months post-intervention. Our findings suggest that labor market information of this kind is both valuable and actionable in our context.