Punishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes?
Journal of Development Economics · 2024 · Loreto Cox、Sylvia Eyzaguirre、Francisco Gallego、Maximiliano García
中文摘要
本文探讨了在市长竞选连任时，提供市立学校教育成果信息所产生的选举效应。我们在智利设计并实施了一项实验，在2016年市政选举前，向400个随机抽取的投票站的128,033名选民寄送了信件。信件包含了当地公立学校过去的考试成绩（水平与变化），以及可比市政的平均或最大成果。我们的发现未显示信件具有实质的平均影响，但当信件包含较差的教育成果时，选民投票率下降，几乎一对一地转化为现任市长得票的减少。选民对水平层面的教育成果以及以平均成果为基准的信件做出反应。当较差的教育成果对选民而言是坏消息时，结果尤为强烈。我们还在市政委员会选举中发现了溢出效应。总体而言，我们的发现表明，当面对有关其表现的某些（但并非全部）类型的信息时，选民会对政治家进行问责。
Abstract
This paper explores the electoral effects of providing information on the educational outcomes of municipal schools when the mayor is running for reelection. We designed and implemented an experiment in Chile whereby we sent 128,033 letters to voters in 400 randomly selected polling stations prior to the 2016 municipal elections. The letters included information on past test scores for local public schools (levels and changes), and either average or maximum outcomes for comparable municipalities. Our findings do not reveal a relevant average impact of the letters, but when they contain poor educational outcomes, voter turnout decreases, translating almost one to one in decreases in votes for the incumbent mayor. Voters respond to educational results in levels and to letters that have average results as a benchmark. The results are especially strong when poor educational outcomes come as bad news to voters. We also find spillover effects in the municipal council election. Overall, our findings suggest that voters hold politicians accountable when faced to certain (but not all) types of information on their performance. JEL Codes: D72, H75, I25.