具有网络效应的搭售
Tying with Network Effects
American Economic Review · 2025 · [{"name": "Jay Pil Choi", "affiliation": ["Michigan State University"]}, {"name": "Doh-Shin Jeon", "affiliation": ["Toulouse School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Michael D. Whinston", "affiliation": ["Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology"]}]
中文摘要
我们提出了一个网络效应市场中搭售的杠杆理论。当某一市场中的垄断者无法从消费者处完全提取剩余时, 搭售便可成为一种机制: 未被利用的消费者剩余借此被用作需求侧杠杆, 从而在另一个以网络效应为特征的市场中创造出"准安装基础"优势。我们的机制并不要求对搭售作任何预先承诺; 相反, 搭售是一种能降低被搭售市场竞争对手质量的最优反应。搭售虽可能导致被搭售市场的竞争对手被排除, 但也可能扩大搭售产品的使用, 因而其福利效应并不确定。(JEL D41, D85, K21, L15, L40)
Abstract
We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects. (JEL D41, D85, K21, L15, L40)