中文摘要
对少数群体的歧视在许多社会中普遍存在,但人们对少数群体为尽量减少歧视所采取的策略知之甚少。在我们于格鲁吉亚对758名高中生开展的信任博弈实验中,格鲁吉亚族信任方对亚美尼亚族少数群体存在歧视行为。我们引入一个初始信号传递阶段,以考察亚美尼亚人为避免预期歧视而隐藏自身族裔身份的意愿。43%的亚美尼亚族被信任方不实地发出自己拥有格鲁吉亚姓名的信号。信号传递行为受预期转移金额和基于身份的动机驱动。这种对族裔身份的策略性虚假陈述提高了格鲁吉亚族信任方的预期返还金额,并消除了他们的歧视行为。
Abstract
Discrimination against minorities is pervasive in many societies, but little is known about strategies that minorities apply to minimize discrimination. In our trust game with 758 high-school students in the country of Georgia, ethnic Georgian trustors discriminate against the ethnic Armenian minority group. We introduce an initial signaling stage to investigate Armenians’ willingness to hide their ethnicity to avoid expected discrimination. 43 percent of Armenian trustees untruthfully signal that they have a Georgian name. Signaling behavior is driven by expected transfers and identity-based motives. This strategic misrepresentation of ethnicity increases Georgian trustors’ expected back transfers and eliminates their discriminatory behavior.