Econometrica · 2025 · [{"name": "Scott T. Nelson", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}]
中文摘要
2009 年的《信用卡问责、责任与披露法》(CARD Act)限制了信用卡放贷机构基于新信息上调借款人利率的能力。定价对借款人风险与需求特征的公开信号和私人信号的反应性下降, 价格离散度降低了三分之一。本文估计了这一向更趋统一(合并)定价转变的效率效应与分配效应。高风险和价格缺乏弹性的消费者面临的价格下降, 但市场中其他部分的价格上升, 并对超过 30% 最安全的次级借款人而言, 价格首次超过了其支付意愿。总体而言, 平均成交价格下降, 且在所有信用评分区间消费者剩余均上升。消费者剩余的提高, 部分源于放贷机构利润的下降, 部分源于该法案对借款人的保险价值——这些借款人在其违约风险发生不利变化后仍能保留有利定价。CARD Act 实施前相对较高的加价水平, 对实现这些剩余收益至关重要。
Abstract
The 2009 CARD Act limited credit card lenders' ability to raise borrowers' interest rates on the basis of new information. Pricing became less responsive to public and private signals of borrowers' risk and demand characteristics, and price dispersion fell by one‐third. I estimate the efficiency and distributional effects of this shift toward more pooled pricing. Prices fell for high‐risk and price‐inelastic consumers, but prices rose elsewhere in the market and newly exceeded willingness to pay for over 30% of the safest subprime borrowers. On net, average traded prices fell and consumer surplus rose at all credit scores. Higher consumer surplus was partly driven by a fall in lender profits, and partly by the Act's insurance value to borrowers who could retain favorable pricing after adverse changes to their default risk. The relatively high level of pre‐CARD‐Act markups was crucial for realizing these surplus gains.