Market Entry, Fighting Brands, and Tacit Collusion: Evidence from the French Mobile Telecommunications Market
中文摘要
我们研究了法国移动通信市场的一次重大新进入，以及随后三家在位企业引入战斗品牌的行为。借助一个实证寡头模型，我们发现，在位企业的战斗品牌策略难以被合理解释为单方面最优反应。相反，其策略与默契半合谋的破裂相一致：进入之前，在位企业能够成功地就限制产品种类以规避同类相食达成协调；进入之后，由于业务窃取激励增强，这一结果变得更难以维持。消费者从产品种类的增加中获得可观收益，并从在位企业的价格反应中获得较小程度的收益。（JEL L13, L21, L96, M31）
Abstract
We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by the introduction of fighting brands by the three incumbents. Using an empirical oligopoly model, we find that the incumbents’ fighting brand strategies are difficult to rationalize as unilateral best responses. Instead, their strategies are consistent with a breakdown of tacit semi-collusion: before entry, the incumbents could successfully coordinate on restricting product variety to avoid cannibalization; after entry, this outcome became harder to sustain because of increased business stealing incentives. Consumers gained considerably from the added variety and, to a lesser extent, from the incumbents’ price responses. (JEL L13, L21, L96, M31)