中文摘要
印度《产业纠纷法》（IDA）规定，大型制造企业若想缩减用工规模，必须承担高额成本。自21世纪初以来，这些大型企业大幅增加了对不受上述监管约束的合同工的使用。2000年至2015年间，在员工人数超过100人的企业中，合同工占非管理岗位就业的比重几乎翻了一番（从21个百分点升至40个百分点）；而在员工人数少于50人的企业中，这一比重仅从14个百分点升至17个百分点。同期，印度正规制造业企业规模分布的右尾厚度增加，大型企业的劳动平均产品下降，大型企业的就业创造率提高，且大型企业推出新产品的概率上升。我们认为，这些变化是合同用工使用增加所导致的。在一个企业增长受解雇成本约束的模型中，我们表明，自21世纪初以来，放宽合同用工的可得性使印度制造业的全要素生产率（TFP）提高了7.3%；这一提升完全源于大型与小型企业之间资源错配的一次性减少，而长期增长率几乎没有变化。
Abstract
India's Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) requires large manufacturing plants to pay substantial costs if they wish to shrink their workforce. Since the early 2000s, these large plants have dramatically increased their use of contract workers who are not subject to these regulatory constraints. Between 2000 and 2015, the contract labor share in non‐managerial employment nearly doubled at establishments with more than 100 workers (from 21 to 40 percentage points), while it only increased from 14 to 17 percentage points at establishments with less than 50 workers. Over the same period, the thickness of the right tail of the establishment size distribution in formal Indian manufacturing plants increased, the average product of labor at large plants declined, the job creation rate for large plants increased, and the probability that large plants introduced new products rose. We argue that these changes were caused by the increased adoption of contract labor. In a model of establishment growth subject to firing costs, we show that easing access to contract labor increased TFP in Indian manufacturing by 7.3% since the early 2000s, occurring all through a one‐time reduction in misallocation between large and small plants with negligible change in the long‐run growth rate.