中文摘要
两个相互对立的利益方（IPs）竞相影响具有异质性先验信念的公民，这些公民接收由各种来源制作的新闻条目。利益方争相俘获这些新闻条目所传达的报道内容。我们刻画了新闻条目的均衡俘获水平以及信息传递的均衡水平。俘获使事前最具信息量的消息更为普遍，并能解释新闻条目层面报道倾向的经验分布。相互对立的俘获努力不会彼此抵消，反而会削弱社会学习，因为理性公民会对具有信息量的消息打折扣。公民的怀疑使双方俘获新闻的努力具有策略替代关系。由于这种策略替代关系，影响力竞争与成功媒体之间的横向差异化可以并存。在均衡中，理性公民尽管知道消息存在偏向，仍会选择消费来自与自身立场一致的来源的消息，这种行为与近期的经验证据一致。
Abstract
Two opposed interested parties (IPs) compete to influence citizens with heterogeneous priors which receive news items produced by a variety of sources. The IPs fight to capture the coverage conveyed in these items. We characterize the equilibrium level of capture of item as well as the equilibrium level of information transmission. Capture increases the prevalence of the ex ante most informative messages and can explain the empirical distribution of slant at the news‐item level. Opposite capturing efforts do not cancel each other and instead undermine social learning as rational citizens discount informative messages. Citizen skepticism makes efforts to capture the news strategic substitutes. Because of strategic substitution, competition for influence is compatible with horizontal differentiation between successful media. In equilibrium, rational citizens choose to consume messages from aligned sources despite knowledge of the bias in a manner consistent with recent empirical evidence.