信托责任与金融建议市场
Fiduciary Duty and the Market for Financial Advice
Econometrica · 2025 · [{"name": "Vivek Bhattacharya", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Gastón Illanes", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Manisha Padi", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
信义义务旨在解决委托—代理问题，而美国正处于一场围绕是否应将其扩展至所有金融顾问的旷日持久的辩论之中。利用递延年金的交易层面数据集以及普通法信义义务在州层面的差异，我们发现，信义义务使风险调整后收益提高了 25 个基点，并导致受影响企业的进入下降了 16%。通过一个关于进入与建议提供的模型视角，我们表明，这一效应既可能源于固定成本的上升，也可能源于提供低质量建议的成本的上升。我们展示了如何区分这两种渠道，并发现二者在实证上均具有相关性。反事实模拟表明，进一步提高信义义务的严格程度会单调地改善建议质量。
Abstract
Fiduciary duty aims to solve principal‐agent problems, and the United States is in the middle of a protracted debate surrounding the merits of extending it to all financial advisers. Leveraging a transaction‐level data set of deferred annuities and state‐level variation in common law fiduciary duty, we find that it raises risk‐adjusted returns by 25 bp and leads to a 16% decline in the entry of affected firms. Through the lens of a model of entry and advice provision, we show that this effect can be due to both an increase in fixed costs and an increase in the cost of providing low‐quality advice. We show how to disentangle these channels and find that both are empirically relevant. Counterfactual simulations show that further increases in the stringency of fiduciary duty monotonically improve advice quality.