Which Workers Left the Labor Force Post-COVID Recession and Why?: Filing, Tax Credit Take-Up, and Labor Force Engagement by Occupation
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · Andrew C. Barr、Laura Kawano、Bruce Sacerdote、Michael Stevens
中文摘要
COVID-19大流行最初导致失业率急剧上升，随后劳动力市场却出乎意料地紧张。利用包含新构建的工人职业信息的面板税收数据，我们记录了持续的劳动力退出，尤其是在低收入和低技能工人中更为突出。低技能未婚男性退出的可能性远高于其他群体，这加深了近期对该群体经济和社会参与度的担忧。与主流理论相反，我们发现几乎没有证据表明学校停课、病毒暴露、刺激支付或失业救济能够解释这些退出。退出也无法由职业或企业质量的进一步升级来解释。退出劳动力队伍的个人（平均而言）并未弥补缺失的收入；然而，自雇收入替代了大约四分之一的损失的W-2收入。这些事实表明，在一大批已找到以更少收入维持生计方式的工人中，为低薪工作的意愿下降了，对闲暇和工作灵活性的偏好上升了。这些结果对后疫情经济中的税收政策、财政预测和劳动力市场动态具有启示。
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic caused a sharp initial rise in unemployment, followed by an unexpectedly tight labor market. Using a panel of tax data containing newly assembled information on worker occupation, we document persistent labor force exit, especially among low-income and low-skill workers. Low-skilled unmarried men are by far the most likely to exit, reinforcing recent concerns regarding the economic and social engagement of this group. Contrary to prevailing theories, we find little evidence that school closures, virus exposure, stimulus payments, or unemployment benefits explain these exits. Nor is the exit explained by additional upgrading of occupations or firm quality. Individuals who leave the labor force do not (on average) make up the missing income; however, self-employment income replaces roughly a quarter of the lost W-2 income. The facts suggest that the willingness to work for low pay decreased and preferences for leisure and job flexibility increased among a large set of workers who have found ways to get by with less income. These results have implications for tax policy, fiscal projections, and labor market dynamics in the post-pandemic economy.