中文摘要
腐败的政府招聘在发展中国家很普遍。本文利用原始数据记录了某卫生官僚机构中腐败招聘的运作方式及其后果。受雇者支付平均相当于17个月工资的贿赂，但与传统认知相反，其可观测的素质与反事实的择优录用者相当。利用职位间的差异，我表明腐败配置的后果取决于申请者中财富与素质之间的相关性：对于这种相关性为正的职位，公共服务提供结果良好；而当该相关性为负时，结果则较差。在本研究设定中，该相关性通常为正，从而使得受雇者的绩效相对较好。(JEL D73, I11, J16, J24, J45, M51, O17)
Abstract
Corrupt government hiring is common in developing countries. This paper uses original data to document the operation and consequences of corrupt hiring in a health bureaucracy. Hires pay bribes averaging 17 months of salary, but contrary to conventional wisdom, their observable quality is comparable to counterfactual merit-based hires. Exploiting variation across jobs, I show that the consequences of corrupt allocations depend on the correlation between wealth and quality among applicants: service delivery outcomes are good for jobs where this was positive and poor when negative. In this setting, the correlation was typically positive, leading to relatively good performance of hires. (JEL D73, I11, J16, J24, J45, M51, O17)