中文摘要
我们研究一个重复的价格领导博弈，其中一家企业向竞争对手联盟提议在伯特兰价格之上的超额加价。利用模型结构，超额加价与边际成本可从价格和数量数据中恢复。在对啤酒行业的应用中，我们发现相较于伯特兰竞争，价格领导在2006和2007财年使利润增加了17%，在2010和2011年增加了22%，该变化主要归因于行业整合。我们模拟了两起并购，它们放松了束紧的激励相容约束并增加了超额加价。即使在存在足以抵消伯特兰竞争下价格上涨的效率改进时，这些协调效应依然存在。（JEL G34, K21, L13, L14, L41, L66）
Abstract
We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model’s structure. In an application to the beer industry, we find that price leadership increases profit relative to Bertrand competition by 17 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and by 22 percent in 2010 and 2011, with the change mostly due to consolidation. We simulate two mergers, which relax binding incentive compatibility constraints and increase supermarkups. These coordinated effects arise even with efficiencies that offset price increases under Bertrand competition. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L14, L41, L66)