What determines where opportunity knocks? Political affiliation in the selection of Opportunity Zones
Journal of Public Economics · 2022 · Mary Margaret Frank、Jeffrey L. Hoopes、Rebecca Lester
中文摘要
我们考察了政治派别在机会区选择中的作用，机会区是由2017年《减税与就业法案》颁布的一项基于地域的税收激励。我们发现，当普查区的州代表是州长所在政党的成员时，州长平均选定该普查区作为机会区的可能性高出7.6%。这一效应是在那些增加了选定可能性的地方人口因素（如较低的收入水平和此前当地状况的改善）之外的增量效应。对具有政治关联的普查区的选择在共和党执政的州中最为突出，该效应增加至13.2%。此外，我们发现部分州长在选择机会区时采用的两种程序——全州按比例分配以及将初步提名权下放给地方当局——抵消了政治派别的作用。这些结果增进了我们对基于地域的经济激励选择的理解，提供了与当前及未来的学术文献和立法提案相关的证据。
Abstract
We examine the role of political affiliation during the selection of Opportunity Zones, a place-based tax incentive enacted by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. We find governors are on average 7.6% more likely to select a census tract as an Opportunity Zone when the tract’s state representative is a member of the governor’s political party. This effect is incremental to local demographic factors that increased the likelihood of selection, such as lower income levels and preceding improvements in local conditions. Selection of politically affiliated tracts is greatest in Republican-governed states, where the effect increases to 13.2%. Furthermore, we find two procedures used by some governors when selecting Opportunity Zones – proportional allocation across a state and delegation of initial nominations to local authorities – offset the role of political affiliation. These results enhance our understanding of the selection of place-based economic incentives, providing evidence relevant for concurrent and future academic literature and legislative proposals.