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政治精英与“真相之战”

Political elites and the “War on Truth’’
Journal of Public Economics · 2022 · Thomas Bräuninger、Nikolay Marinov

中文摘要

自利的政治精英在何种条件下会选择发动“真相之战”(WOT)?我们在现有洞见的基础上——即WOT会促使选民退缩与怀疑——进一步表明,散播不信任是改变公众信息环境的一种策略。我们构建了一个形式化模型,其中精英在政策议题上的证据对其不利时(如政治丑闻期间)会推行这一策略。我们刻画了发起者面临的“WOT权衡”:使选民陷入瘫痪会锁定现状,从而阻止公众推行精英所不喜欢的政策变革,但也会削弱精英实际上可能喜欢的未来政策变革。我们借助克里姆林宫在西方媒体市场推行的若干话语实例,以及“弱化”民主国家中的信息环境,来展示我们的论点如何解释阴谋论传播——一种显著的WOT策略——在发生与强度上的差异。

Abstract

Under what conditions do self-serving political elites choose to engage in “war on truth” (WOT)? We build on existing insights, which maintain that WOT promotes withdrawal and skepticism among voters, to show that seeding mistrust is one strategy for altering the information environment of the public. We build a formal model in which elites push the strategy when evidence on a policy issue goes against them such as during a political scandal. We characterize the “WOT trade-off” faced by initiators: immobilizing voters locks in the status quo and thereby prevents the public from enacting policy change the elite dislikes, but it also undermines future policy changes the elite may in fact like. We draw on a number of illustrations from discourse pushed by the Kremlin on Western media markets and from the informational environment in “diminished” democracies to demonstrate how our argument explains variation in the occurrence and intensity of conspiracy-spreading, one notable WOT strategy.
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