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绩效薪酬、生产率与战略性退出:来自社区健康中心的证据

Performance pay, productivity, and strategic opt-out: Evidence from a community health center
Journal of Public Economics · 2022 · Brian C. Cadena、Austin C. Smith

中文摘要

我们利用一家主要服务低收入患者的健康中心的数据,考察医疗提供者对从固定薪资的薪酬计划转向按每月接诊更多患者给予奖励的计划的产出反应。按计件工资工作的提供者产生的患者接诊量增加了18%,但这一增加中仅有一小部分归因于个体对激励的反应。其余部分则源于劳动力构成的变化,以及提供者关于何时加入计件工资计划的战略性选择。这一微小的激励效应与实验证据一致,即当个体为一个使命与其价值观一致的组织工作时,努力对财务激励的敏感度较低。

Abstract

We use data from a health center serving primarily low-income patients to examine medical providers’ output responses to a change from a salary-based compensation plan to one that rewards providers for seeing more patients each month. Providers working for piece rates produce 18 percent more patient encounters, but only a small portion of this increase was due to individual responses to the incentives. The remainder resulted from changes in workforce composition and from providers’ strategic choices about when to join the piece-rate plan. The small incentive effect is consistent with experimental evidence that effort is less sensitive to financial incentives when individuals work for an organization whose mission is aligned with their values.
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