Workplace disruptions, judge caseloads, and judge decisions: Evidence from SSA judicial corps retirements
中文摘要
我们利用社会保障残疾保险司法队伍中的法官退休，来记录留任法官如何应对工作场所冲击。当一位同僚法官退休时，留任法官的结案量和裁决量会出现5%的增长，并持续6个月。残疾上诉程序的制度特征使我们能够在保持案件构成不变的情况下，估计案件量增加时法官裁决会发生什么变化。案件量的增加伴随着法官有利裁决份额1%的下降，这表明样本中有16,600名申请人未能获得残疾保险，而若不存在该工作场所冲击，他们本会获得残疾保险。
Abstract
We exploit judge retirements from the Social Security Disability Insurance judicial corps to document how remaining judges respond to workplace disruptions. When a peer judge retires, the remaining judges see a 5 percent increase in dispositions and decisions that lasts 6 months. Institutional features of the disability appeal process allow us to estimate what happens to judge decisions when caseloads increase, holding the composition of cases fixed. Increased caseloads are accompanied by a 1 percent decrease in the judges’ share of favorable decisions, suggesting 16,600 claimants in-sample were not awarded disability insurance who would have been, absent the workplace disruption.