← ireadpaper · 顶刊中的公共政策研究

多边政权更迭

Multilateral regime change
Journal of Public Economics · 2021 · Jon X. Eguia

中文摘要

本文提出一个政策动机驱动的多边冲突理论。考虑这样一种环境:一个“目标”国实施其他国家认为有害的国内政策。任何足够强大的国家都可以对目标国发起干预,以更换其政权及其政策,而任何国家都可以支持或反对任何干预。我研究是否进行干预、以及支持或反对每一次干预的决策。该理论给出了符合直觉的比较静态结果:在互联程度更高的世界中、如果目标国规模更小、或者目标国政府偏好的政策更为极端,则干预更可能发生。为衡量联盟的有效性,我构建了一个多边干预贡献中“相对牺牲”的度量指标。以阿富汗(2001–2014年)为例证,我认为美国、英国和加拿大做出了较高的相对牺牲,而所有其他欧洲北约盟国牺牲甚少。

Abstract

I present a theory of policy-motivated multilateral conflict. Consider an environment in which a “Target”country implements domestic policies that other countries find harmful. Any sufficiently powerful country can launch an intervention in the Target country to replace its regime and its policies, and any country can support or oppose any intervention. Istudy the decisions to intervene, and to support or oppose each intervention. The theory delivers intuitive comparative statics: an intervention is more likely in a more interconnected world, if the Target nation is smaller, or if the policy preferred by the Target’s government is more extreme. To measure the effectiveness of alliances, Idevelop a measure of “relative sacrifice”in contributions to multilateral interventions. Using Afghanistan (2001–2014) as an illustration, Iargue that the relative sacrifice made by the US, the UK, and Canada was high, while all other European NATOallies sacrificed little.
在 ireadpaper 查看全部 →