Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation
American Economic Review · 2021 · Daniel C. Waldinger
中文摘要
公共住房福利通过等待名单进行配给。关于公共住房分配的理论研究一直争论申请人应在多大程度上对住房单元拥有选择权，并指出了效率与再分配之间可能存在的权衡。本文利用马萨诸塞州剑桥市的等待名单数据，实证确立了这一权衡的存在及其经济重要性。我在异质性公寓通过等待时间配给的设定下，估计了一个公共住房偏好模型。取消选择将改善定向，但会使租户福利降低超过30%。这种改变只有在存在对再分配的强烈社会偏好时，才能基于定向依据获得正当性。(JEL D47, H75, I38, R38)
Abstract
Public housing benefits are rationed through wait lists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using wait list data from Cambridge, Massachusetts. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution. (JEL D47, H75, I38, R38)