延迟接受的实验评估: 来自 100 多个军官劳动力市场的证据
An Experimental Evaluation of Deferred Acceptance: Evidence From Over 100 Army Officer Labor Markets
Econometrica · 2026 · [{"name": "Jonathan M.V. Davis", "affiliation": ["University of Oregon"]}, {"name": "Kyle Greenberg", "affiliation": ["United States Military Academy", "International Zinc Association"]}, {"name": "Damon Jones", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}]
中文摘要
内部劳动力市场在组织内部将劳动者匹配到岗位方面正变得日益重要。我们提供了来自一项随机试验的证据，该试验比较了两种匹配方式：一是使用延迟接受（deferred acceptance, DA）算法将劳动者匹配到岗位，二是传统的由管理者主导的匹配流程。我们的研究场景是美国陆军的内部劳动力市场，该市场每年将超过14,000名军官匹配到各单位。我们发现，DA 降低了行政负担，并提高了匹配质量——衡量指标包括正当嫉妒（justified envy）的减少、真实偏好报告的增加，以及军官和单位对其匹配结果的偏好。在军官开始新岗位后的两年内，DA 对军官留任与绩效的总体影响，受到军官与单位之间策略性偏好协调的限制。然而，在管理者经验不足的市场中，DA 显著改善了军官的留任和晋升。我们的研究结果表明，内部劳动力市场中各方（代理人）之间的跨市场沟通，可能削弱防策略（strategyproof）匹配算法的收益。
Abstract
Internal labor markets are increasingly important for matching workers to jobs within organizations. We present evidence from a randomized trial that compares matching workers to jobs using the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm to the traditional manager‐directed matching process. Our setting is the U.S. Army's internal labor market, which matches over 14,000 officers to units annually. We find that DA reduces administrative burden and increases match quality as measured by reduced justified envy, increased truthful preference reporting, and officers' and units' preferences over their matches. The overall impact of DA on officer retention and performance in the two years after officers started their new jobs is limited by strategic preference coordination between officers and units. However, DA leads to significant improvements in officer retention and promotions in markets with inexperienced managers. Our findings suggest that cross‐market communication between agents in internal labor markets can attenuate the benefits of strategyproof matching algorithms.