中文摘要
为什么以谋求公职为导向的政治家有时会宣扬与其选民不一致的观点？不一致的陈述能否传递关于政治家当选后将如何行事的信息？如果能，选民为何会选举发表此类陈述的政治家？此外，竞选活动是否也能直接影响当选官员的行为？我们构建了一个选举中可信“廉价磋商”——无成本且无约束力的沟通——的模型。其基础是选民内生的偏好：选民更偏好已知与其不一致的政治家，而非一致性足够不确定的政治家。这一偏好之所以产生，是因为对当选官员政策偏好的不确定性会因声誉/职业考量而导致政策制定扭曲。我们表明，廉价磋商能够改变选民对政治家政策偏好的信念，从而影响当选官员的行为。信息性廉价磋商既可能增加也可能减少选民福利，当声誉考量更为重要时，福利改善的空间更大。
Abstract
Why do office-motivated politicians sometimes espouse views that are non-congruent with their electorate’s? Can non-congruent statements convey any information about what a politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politician who makes such statements? Furthermore, can electoral campaigns also directly affect an elected official’s behaviour? We develop a model of credible “cheap talk”—costless and non-binding communication—in elections. The foundation is an endogenous voter preference for a politician who is known to be non-congruent over one whose congruence is sufficiently uncertain. This preference arises because uncertainty about an elected official’s policy preferences generates policymaking distortions due to reputation/career concerns. We show that cheap talk can alter the electorate’s beliefs about a politician’s policy preferences and thereby affect the elected official’s behaviour. Informative cheap talk can increase or decrease voter welfare, with a greater scope for welfare benefits when reputation concerns are more important.