中文摘要
对环境标准的间歇性监测可能诱使排污活动发生策略性变化。本文记录了在联邦《清洁空气法》下，针对每六天一次的周期性空气质量监测安排所出现的局部策略性反应。利用受监测地区的卫星数据，我发现未监测日的空气质量统计显著更差。这一效应可由监测日对污染的短期抑制来解释，尤其是在城市不合规风险较高的高污染时期。城市在监测日发布空气质量预警的频率增加，这表明地方政府在协调减排方面发挥了作用。（JEL K32, Q35, Q58, R11）
Abstract
Intermittent monitoring of environmental standards may induce strategic changes in polluting activities. This paper documents local strategic responses to a cyclical, once-every-six-day air quality monitoring schedule under the federal Clean Air Act. Using satellite data of monitored areas, I show that air quality is significantly worse on unmonitored days. This effect is explained by short-term suppression of pollution on monitored days, especially during high-pollution periods when the city’s noncompliance risk is high. Cities’ use of air quality warnings increases on monitored days, which suggests local governments’ role in coordinating emission reductions. (JEL K32, Q35, Q58, R11)