Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
中文摘要
若干学区采用的分配系统会激励学生误报其偏好。我们在剑桥发现了与策略性行为相一致的证据。此类策略行为会使偏好分析复杂化。本文为在一类新的且范围很广的学校选择机制中研究随机效用模型开发了实证方法。我们证明，在选择环境存在充分变异或存在偏好偏移因子的条件下，偏好是非参数识别的。随后我们开发了一种易于处理的估计程序，并将其应用于剑桥。估计结果表明，尽管82%的学生被分配到了其陈述的第一志愿，但只有72%的学生被分配到了其真实的第一志愿，因为学生会避免将竞争激烈的学校排在前面。假设学生行为最优，对平均学生而言，即时接受机制优于延迟接受机制，其等价差异为0.08英里。如果信念存在偏差，估计的差异会变小；如果学生如实报告，则差异方向反转。
Abstract
Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences.We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in Cambridge.Such strategizing can complicate preference analysis.This paper develops empirical methods for studying random utility models in a new and large class of school choice mechanisms.We show that preferences are non-parametrically identified under either sufficient variation in choice environments or a preference shifter.We then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to Cambridge.Estimates suggest that while 82% of students are assigned to their stated first choice, only 72% are assigned to their true first choice because students avoid ranking competitive schools.Assuming that students behave optimally, the Immediate Acceptance mechanism is preferred by the average student to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism by an equivalent of 0.08 miles.The estimated difference is smaller if beliefs are biased, and reversed if students report truthfully.