Journal of Public Economics · 2021 · Magnus Carlsson、Gordon B. Dahl、Dan‐Olof Rooth
中文摘要
本文研究，一旦极右翼瑞典民主党在地方层面增加了其政治代表，公众对其标志性政策（减少移民）的态度会如何反应。为识别因果效应，我们使用来自290个市政选举区的面板数据，比较在其他方面相似的选举中，瑞典民主党勉强多赢或勉强多输一个席位的情况。我们估计，该极右翼反移民政党席位增加一席，会使对移民的负面态度减少1.8或4.1个百分点（取决于使用哪项全国性调查），这与该党的政策立场相反。与这些态度变化相一致，我们发现了提示性证据，表明瑞典民主党失去了瑞典其他小党所享有的在任者优势。在探讨可能的作用机制时，我们发现了政治家更替率更高和负面报纸报道增加的证据。这些发现表明，随着边缘政党及其观点受到更严格的审视，政治代表可以引起态度上的反噬。
Abstract
This paper studies how public attitudes towards reduced immigration, the signature policy of the far-right Sweden Democrats, respond once the party increases their political representation at the local level. To identify causal effects, we use panel data from 290 municipal election districts and compare otherwise similar elections where the Sweden Democrats either barely win or lose an additional seat. We estimate that a one seat increase for this far-right, anti-immigration party decreases negative attitudes towards immigration by 1.8 or 4.1 percentage points (depending on which national survey we use), contrary to the party’s policy position. Consistent with these attitudinal changes, we find suggestive evidence the Sweden Democrats lose the incumbency advantage experienced by other small parties in Sweden. Exploring possible mechanisms, we find evidence for higher politician turnover and a rise in negative newspaper coverage. These findings demonstrate that political representation can cause an attitudinal backlash as a fringe party and their ideas are placed under closer scrutiny.