Do prize-linked incentives promote positive financial behavior? Evidence from a debt reduction intervention
中文摘要
我们实施了首项考察彩票式激励能否有效促进债务削减的实地实验，方法是在债务管理计划中的6,907名借款人中随机分配该计划的参与机会。我们发现该计划的参与率很高，且参与者在还款上更及时，偿还的债务更多。然而，对于按时还款、计划退出和债务水平的平均处理效应估计值（46.7美元，95% CI = [−132美元, 225美元]，对照组均值 = 11,558美元）均为精确的零。我们的结果表明，尽管存在强烈的兴趣和正相关，彩票式激励可能并未改变债务偿还行为，而仅仅是吸引了那些事前就有可能还款的个体。
Abstract
We conduct the first field experiment examining whether prize-linked incentives can be effective in promoting debt reduction by randomizing access among 6,907 borrowers in a debt management plan. We find strong take-up of the program and that takers were timelier with repayment and paid off more debt. However, average treatment effect estimates for on-time payments, programmatic dropout, and debt levels (46.7 dollars, 95% CI = [−$132, $225], control mean = $11,558) are all precise zeros. Our results suggest that despite strong interest and positive correlations, prize-linked incentives may not modify debt repayment behavior and may simply attract individuals who are ex-ante likely to repay.