American Economic Review · 2021 · Girum Abebe、Stefano A. Caria、Esteban Ortiz-Ospina
中文摘要
我们研究劳动力市场中的搜寻摩擦如何影响企业招募有才能工人的能力。在埃塞俄比亚的一项实地实验中，我们表明雇主可以通过为提交求职申请提供小额货币激励来吸引更多有才能的申请者。结构模型的估计表明，该干预之所以有效，是因为提交求职申请的成本很大，且与求职者能力正相关。我们提供证据表明，这种正相关是由动态选择驱动的。在第二项实验中，我们表明当地招聘者低估了申请激励的积极影响。(JEL J23, J24, J31, J64, O15)
Abstract
We study how search frictions in the labor market affect firms’ ability to recruit talented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. Estimates from a structural model suggest that the intervention is effective because the cost of making a job application is large, and positively correlated with jobseeker ability. We provide evidence that this positive correlation is driven by dynamic selection. In a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts of application incentives. (JEL J23, J24, J31, J64, O15)