Review of Economic Studies · 2017 · Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn、Lones Smith、Katalin Bognar
中文摘要
我们探讨了两位信息不对称且可能存在偏误的陪审员之间的高成本审议：鹰派 Lones 与鸽派 Moritz 交替坚持某一裁决，直至一方让步。辩论依偏误不同而呈现两种类型之一：若某位陪审员（例如 Lones）希望占据上风并使任何接下来让步的 Moritz 类型达成有罪判决，则他是固执的。相反，若 Lones 希望最强硬的让步 Moritz 类型推动无罪判决，则他是矛盾的。在偏误较小或延迟成本较高时，两位陪审员都处于矛盾状态。随着 Lones 变得更加鹰派，他更有力地为有罪判决辩护，从而减少错误的无罪判决。如果鸽派的 Moritz 是固执的，那么他会软化（策略替代），导致更多的错误有罪判决。矛盾型辩论是一种新情形，它带来了极化加剧的一种新颖的动态收益。因为如果 Moritz 是矛盾的，那么他会变得更强硬（策略互补），于是令人惊讶的是，更加鹰派的 Lones 会带来更少的错误无罪判决与错误有罪判决。因此，与静态廉价磋商不同，更加极化但均衡的辩论能够改善沟通。我们还表明，有耐心且偏误不太大的陪审员会在辩论接近尾声时投票反对自己的后验信念，从而最优地扮演魔鬼代言人。我们由此对对抗制法律体系、无因回避以及终结辩论规则作出阐释。
Abstract
We explore costly deliberation by two differentially informed and possibly biased jurors: A hawk Lones and a dove Moritz alternately insist on a verdict until one concedes. Debate assumes one of two genres, depending on bias: A juror, say Lones, is intransigent if he wishes to prevail and reach a conviction for any type of Moritz next to concede. In contrast, Lones is ambivalent if he wants the strongest conceding types of Moritz to push for acquittal. Both jurors are ambivalent with small bias or high delay costs. As Lones grows more hawkish, he argues more forcefully for convictions, mitigating wrongful acquittals. If dovish Moritz is intransigent, then he softens (strategic substitutes), leading to more wrongful convictions. Ambivalent debate is new, and yields a novel dynamic benefit of increased polarization. For if Moritz is ambivalent, then he toughens (strategic complements), and so, surprisingly, a more hawkish Lones leads to fewer wrongful acquittals and convictions. So more polarized but balanced debate can improve communication, unlike in static cheap talk. We also show that patient and not too biased jurors vote against their posteriors near the end of the debate, optimally playing devil’s advocate. We shed light on the adversarial legal system, peremptory challenges, and cloture rules.