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自报与第三方报告混合模式下的税收执法

Tax enforcement using a hybrid between self- and third-party reporting
Journal of Public Economics · 2021 · Sarah Clifford、Panos Mavrokonstantis

中文摘要

我们研究了一种结合自报与第三方报告要素的税收执法政策。纳税人向税务机关自行申报,但必须提交由第三方出具的凭证以佐证其申报。利用塞浦路斯慈善捐赠扣除申报中文档要求所依据的与薪资挂钩的门槛,我们估计,当纳税人可以在无需凭证的情况下多申报1英镑扣除额时,扣除额会增加0.7英镑。其次,利用一项追溯性改革,我们发现至少有64%的反应纯粹是申报调整,主要表现为对扣除额的过度申报。最后,申报规则驱动了许多纳税人的行为,而这些纳税人对捐赠的财务激励几乎没有反应。

Abstract

We study a tax enforcement policy combining elements of self- and third-party reporting. Taxpayers self-report to the authority but must file documentation issued by a third-party to corroborate claims. Exploiting salary-dependent cutoffs governing documentation requirements when claiming deductions for charitable contributions in Cyprus, we estimate that deductions increase by £0.7 when taxpayers can claim £1 more without documentation. Second, using a retroactive reform we find that at least 64% of the response is purely a reporting adjustment representing mainly over-reporting of deductions. Finally, reporting rules drive the behaviour of many taxpayers who display little responsiveness to financial incentives for giving.
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