中文摘要
尽管现有理论预测，配捐型领导捐赠比种子资金能为公共物品筹集到更多的自愿捐款，但近期的田野实验却发现了相反的结果。我们通过研究一个关于慈善机构所提供公共物品质量信息不完全的领导捐赠模型来调和这两种观点。慈善机构采用的募捐方案与首捐人的捐赠决策都可能向后续捐赠者传递慈善机构质量的信号。如果首捐人了解公共物品的质量，慈善机构的最优选择是寻求配捐。直观上，知情的首捐人通过其捐赠规模向下游捐赠者传递质量信息。因此，慈善机构无需顾虑信号传递问题，并因配捐能够缓解搭便车而选择配捐。然而，当首捐人的信息有限时，对配捐的偏好会减弱。此时，首捐人的捐赠信息含量较低，高质量的慈善机构便将种子资金用作质量的昂贵信号。结果，与配捐相比，种子资金意味着更高的预期质量和更高的预期捐款。
Abstract
While existing theory predicts that matching leadership gifts raise more voluntary contributions for public goods than seed money, recent field experiments find otherwise. We reconcile the two by studying a model of leadership giving with incomplete information about the quality of the public good provided by a charity. Both the fundraising scheme employed by the charity and the contribution decision by the lead donor may signal the charity’s quality to subsequent donors. The charity solicits optimally for a matching gift if the lead donor is informed about the quality of the public good. Intuitively, an informed lead donor conveys quality information to downstream donors through the size of her contribution. As a result, the charity has no signaling concerns and opts for matching because of its ability to mitigate free-riding. The preference for matching, however, reduces when the lead donor’s information is limited. Then, the lead donor’s contribution is less informative and the high quality charity uses seed money as a costly signal of quality. As a result, seed money is associated with higher expected quality and higher expected contributions compared to matching.