能源补贴的效率与公平效应

中文摘要

经济理论表明，能源补贴可能导致过度消费和环境退化。然而，能源补贴的确切影响尚未得到充分理解。我们分析了一项大型能源补贴：加州替代能源费率（CARE）。CARE为天然气和电力的低收入消费者提供价格减免。利用自然实地实验，我们估计CARE客户对天然气的需求价格弹性约为−0.35。该补贴的经济模型得出三个结果。第一，天然气补贴似乎会降低福利。第二，各项政策（如总量控制与交易）的经济影响取决于不同客户的价格是否更接近边际社会成本。第三，CARE客户的收益需要增加6%才能抵消该项目的成本。

Abstract

Economic theory suggests that energy subsidies can lead to excessive consumption and environmental degradation. However, the precise impact of energy subsidies is not well understood. We analyze a large energy subsidy: the California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE). CARE provides a price reduction for low-income consumers of natural gas and electricity. Using a natural field experiment, we estimate the price elasticity of demand for natural gas to be about −0.35 for CARE customers. An economic model of this subsidy yields three results. First, the natural gas subsidy appears to reduce welfare. Second, the economic impact of various policies, such as cap-and-trade, depends on whether prices for various customers move closer to the marginal social cost. Third, benefits to CARE customers need to increase by 6 percent to offset the costs of the program. (JEL C93, D61, H24, L94, L95, L98, Q48)