工作场所致残后的企业安置: 劳动力市场影响及其对补贴设计的启示
Firm Accommodation After Workplace Disability: Labor Market Impacts and Implications for Subsidy Design
Econometrica · 2026 · [{"name": "Naoki Aizawa", "affiliation": ["University of Wisconsin–Madison"]}, {"name": "Corina Mommaerts", "affiliation": ["University of Wisconsin–Madison"]}, {"name": "Stephanie Rennane", "affiliation": ["RAND Corporation"]}]
中文摘要
本文研究工作场所残疾发生后企业便利安排决策对劳动力市场的影响，并评估其对企业补贴设计的启示。我们利用俄勒冈州的一项工伤赔偿（WC）计划，该计划为企业向有工作场所残疾的工人提供便利安排而给予工资补贴。借助丰富的行政数据以及工资补贴的一次政策变更，我们发现便利安排率会对补贴率作出反应，且获得便利安排会使一年后的就业与收入显著提高。为探讨其福利含义，我们构建并估计了一个将便利安排视为一种人力资本投资形式的摩擦性劳动力市场模型。工人离职以及工伤赔偿中不完全的经验费率制，导致工作场所残疾发生后的便利安排不足与低效的劳动力市场结果。反事实模拟表明，补贴便利安排不仅改善经历工作相关残疾的工人的长期劳动力市场结果，而且为大多数工人带来福利收益。
Abstract
This paper studies the labor market impacts of firm accommodation decisions after workplace disability and assesses implications for the design of firm subsidies. We leverage a workers' compensation (WC) program in Oregon that provides wage subsidies to firms for accommodating workers with workplace disabilities. Leveraging rich administrative data and a policy change to the wage subsidy, we show that accommodation rates respond to the subsidy rate and that receipt of accommodation leads to a significant increase in employment and earnings a year later. To explore welfare implications, we develop and estimate a frictional labor market model of accommodation as a form of human capital investment. Worker turnover and imperfect experience rating in WC lead to underaccommodation and inefficient labor market outcomes after workplace disability. Counterfactual simulations show that subsidizing accommodation not only improves long‐run labor market outcomes of workers experiencing work‐related disability but also yields welfare gains for most workers.