墨西哥-美国移民：工资与边境执法的影响

中文摘要

我研究了相对工资和美国边境执法如何影响从墨西哥到美国的移民。为此，我估计了一个离散选择动态规划模型，其中个人的决策取决于其配偶的位置。我使用了一种新的识别策略来估计边境执法对移民的影响，考虑了沿边境资源配置的差异。我使用来自墨西哥移民项目的个人移民决策数据估计了该模型。反事实分析表明，墨西哥工资增加10%将使在美国度过的年数减少约8%。执法力度增加50%可使移民减少高达11.6%。

Abstract

I study how relative wages and U.S. border enforcement affect immigration from Mexico to the United States. To do this, I estimate a discrete choice dynamic programming model where a person’s decisions depend on the location of their spouse. I use a new identification strategy to estimate the effect of border enforcement on immigration, accounting for the variation in the allocation of resources along the border. I estimate the model using data on individual immigration decisions from the Mexican Migration Project. Counterfactuals show that a 10% increase in Mexican wages would decrease the number of years spent in the U.S. by about 8%. A 50% increase in enforcement reduces immigration by up to 11.6%.