财政规则与政治家筛选：来自意大利的理论与证据
Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2025 · [{"name": "Matteo Gamalerio", "affiliation": ["Universitat de Barcelona"]}, {"name": "Federico Trombetta", "affiliation": ["Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore"]}]
中文摘要
财政规则，即对民选官员政策制定自由裁量权的约束，被广泛用于规制财政政策。利用意大利市镇数据，我们采用差分断点（difference-in-discontinuity）设计，为财政规则对市长候选人受教育程度的负面影响提供证据。这一效应主要由财政规则对政治家行动空间形成实质性限制的市镇所驱动。上述结果与一个关于财政规则与政治选择的形式模型相一致。我们强调，减少自由裁量权可能改变参与者群体的构成：它可能缓解分肥（pork barrel）支出，但同时也会对政治家的受教育程度产生负面影响。（JEL D72, E62, H62, H72）
Abstract
Fiscal rules, or constraints on the policymaking discretion of elected officials, are widely used to regulate fiscal policies. Using data on Italian municipalities, we employ a difference-in-discontinuity design to provide evidence of the negative effect of fiscal rules on mayoral candidates’ education. Municipalities in which fiscal rules meaningfully restrict the action space of politicians drive the effect. These results are consistent with a formal model of fiscal rules and political selection. We highlight that reducing discretion may affect the composition of the pool of players: It may alleviate pork barrel spending but also negatively affect the education of politicians. (JEL D72, E62, H62, H72)