American Economic Review · 2021 · Camille Landais、Arash Nekoei、Peter M Nilsson、David Seim、Johannes Spinnewijn
中文摘要
本文研究逆向选择能否为失业保险（UI）的普遍强制参保提供合理解释。基于瑞典失业保险政策的一项独特特征——劳动者可以在最低强制参保额度之上选择补充性失业保险——我们提供了逆向选择在失业保险中存在的首个直接证据，并推导了其对失业保险设计的启示。我们发现，购买补充保险的劳动者其失业风险是不购买者的三倍以上。利用风险与价格上的变异，我们表明这一相关关系中有25%至30%由基于风险的选择所驱动，其余部分则由道德风险所驱动。由于存在道德风险，且尽管存在逆向选择，我们发现对支付意愿较低的个体强制其购买补充保险将是次优的。我们展示了在何种条件下，将选择权留给劳动者的设计方案会优于单一强制参保的失业保险体系。在该设计方案中，对补充保险使用补贴是最优的，并与最低强制参保额度形成互补。
Abstract
This paper studies whether adverse selection can rationalize a universal mandate for unemployment insurance (UI). Building on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt for supplemental UI coverage above a minimum mandate, we provide the first direct evidence for adverse selection in UI and derive its implications for UI design. We find that the unemployment risk is more than twice as high for workers who buy supplemental coverage. Exploiting variation in risk and prices, we show how 25–30 percent of this correlation is driven by risk-based selection, with the remainder driven by moral hazard. Due to the moral hazard and despite the adverse selection we find that mandating the supplemental coverage to individuals with low willingness-to-pay would be suboptimal. We show under which conditions a design leaving choice to workers would dominate a UI system with a single mandate. In this design, using a subsidy for supplemental coverage is optimal and complementary to the use of a minimum mandate. (JEL D82, G22, J65)