When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in US Electricity Generation: Reply
中文摘要
放松监管政策对燃煤电厂燃料价格的平均效应，受到最初支付最高燃料价格的电厂的强烈影响。原始资料表明，这些电厂被锁定在长期、高成本的燃料合同中，只有在放松监管后才获得市场费率。尽管这些电厂的燃料成本并不寻常，但它们对放松监管的反应却并非如此：燃煤电厂和燃气电厂都会使燃料价格下降，下降幅度与其最初支付的高于邻近电厂成本的数额一一对应。排除那些最可能受益者，并不能增进我们对放松监管的理解。（JEL L51, L71, L94, L98, Q35, Q41, Q48）
Abstract
The average effect of deregulatory policies on fuel prices at coal-fired power plants is strongly influenced by plants that were initially paying the highest prices for fuel. Primary sources document that these plants were locked into long-term, high-cost fuel contracts, and only secured market rates post-deregulation. While these plants' fuel costs were unusual, their response to deregulation was not: both coal- and gas-fired plants reduce fuel prices one-for-one with the amount they were initially paying above their neighbors' costs. Our understanding of deregulation is not improved by excluding those who stand to benefit most. (JEL L51, L71, L94, L98, Q35, Q41, Q48)