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动态锦标赛设计:来自预测竞赛的证据

Dynamic Tournament Design: Evidence from Prediction Contests
Journal of Political Economy · 2020 · Jorge Lemus、Guillermo Marshall

中文摘要

在线竞赛已成为创新采购的一种重要形式。竞赛平台通常会展示实时公开排行榜以提供绩效反馈。信息披露对参与者决策的影响在理论上是模糊的:一些参与者可能会气馁并退出,而另一些则可能决定继续努力以保持竞争力。我们使用两种互补的方法研究排行榜对竞赛结果的影响。首先,我们使用观测数据估计一个动态模型,并比较有排行榜和无排行榜情形下的均衡。其次,我们提供了来自学生竞赛的实验证据。我们发现,排行榜平均而言改善了竞赛结果。

Abstract

Online contests have become a prominent form of innovation procurement. Contest platforms often display a real-time public leaderboard to provide performance feedback. The impact of information disclosure on players’ decisions is theoretically ambiguous: some players may get discouraged and quit, while others may decide to keep working to remain competitive. We investigate the impact of a leaderboard on contest outcomes using two complementary approaches. First, we estimate a dynamic model using observational data and compare the equilibria with and without a leaderboard. Second, we present experimental evidence from student competitions. We find that a leaderboard on average improves competition outcomes.
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