Applications and Interviews: Firms’ Recruiting Decisions in a Frictional Labour Market
中文摘要
本文构建一个定向搜寻模型，研究企业为争夺工人而展开的招募决策。这些工人在事后存在两个维度的差异：(1) 其匹配生产率；(2) 其接受工作邀请的概率，而该概率由其申请组合的选择内生决定。为吸引这些工人，企业在交易条件之外还发布招募强度和雇佣标准。更高的招募强度成本更高，但使企业能够筛选更多申请者进入面试，从而揭示其生产率。雇佣标准解决了即时雇佣与等待未来潜在更优匹配之间的权衡。我刻画了均衡，并发现诸多结果——包括均衡的唯一性与招募强度的周期性——关键取决于企业的招募成本和工人的搜寻成本。将模型校准至美国劳动力市场，结果表明存在一个均衡连续统。给定某一特定均衡的选择，雇佣标准呈逆周期性，而招募强度呈顺周期性。经校准的模型比不含集约边际的标准模型产生更大的放大效应，并且从柯布–道格拉斯匹配函数的视角来看，会产生顺周期的匹配效率。
Abstract
I develop a directed search model to study the recruitment decisions of firms competing for workers who ex post differ in two dimensions: (1) their match productivity and (2) their probability of accepting a job offer, endogenously determined by their choice of application portfolio. To attract these workers, firms post a recruiting intensity and a hiring standard, in addition to terms of trade. A higher recruiting intensity is costly, but allows the firm to select more applicants for an interview, which reveals their productivity. The hiring standard solves the tradeoff between immediate hiring and waiting for a potentially better match in the future. I characterize equilibrium and find that various outcomes, including uniqueness of equilibrium and the cyclicality of recruiting intensity, crucially depend on firms’ recruiting cost and workers’ search cost. Calibration of the model to the U.S. labour market indicates a continuum of equilibria. Given selection of a particular equilibrium, hiring standards are countercyclical while recruiting intensity is procyclical. The calibrated model creates more amplification than a standard model without intensive margins and gives rise to procyclical match efficiency when viewed through the lens of a Cobb–Douglas matching function.