American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2025 · Ethan Kaplan、Jörg L. Spenkuch、Haishan Yuan
中文摘要
我们利用自然灾害发生时间的准随机性，研究公众对政治的关注与立法者支持特殊利益之间的联系。我们发现，当灾害发生时，新闻媒体会减少对政治议题总体上、尤其是对个别立法者的报道，而众议院议员采纳特殊利益捐助者立场的可能性显著上升。这一证据表明，当公众注意力被分散时，政治人物更倾向于采取有利于特殊利益集团的行动。更广泛而言，我们的研究结果表明，即使在透明度要求严格的环境中，对政治的关注也能改善选举问责。(JEL D72, L82, Q54)
Abstract
We exploit the quasi-random timing of natural disasters to study the connection between public attention to politics and legislators’ support for special interests. We show that when a disaster strikes, the news media reduce coverage of politics in general and of individual legislators in particular, and members of the House of Representatives become significantly more likely to adopt special interest donors’ positions. The evidence implies that politicians are more inclined to take actions benefiting special interests when the public is distracted. More broadly, our findings suggest that attention to politics improves electoral accountability even in an environment with stringent transparency requirements. (JEL D72, L82, Q54)