暗中迎合：自然灾害如何影响特殊利益政治
Pandering in the Shadows: How Natural Disasters Affect Special Interest Politics
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2025 · [{"name": "Ethan Kaplan", "affiliation": ["University of Maryland, College Park"]}, {"name": "Jörg L. Spenkuch", "affiliation": ["Northwestern University"]}, {"name": "Haishan Yuan", "affiliation": ["The University of Queensland"]}]
中文摘要
我们利用自然灾害发生时间的准随机性，研究公众对政治的关注与立法者对特殊利益的支持之间的联系。我们发现，当灾害发生时，新闻媒体会减少对政治的总体报道，尤其是对个别立法者的报道，而众议院议员采纳特殊利益捐赠者立场的可能性显著上升。上述证据意味着，当公众注意力被分散时，政治人物更倾向于采取有利于特殊利益的行动。更一般地说，我们的发现表明，即使在具有严格透明度要求的环境中，对政治的关注也能改善选举问责。（JEL D72, L82, Q54）
Abstract
We exploit the quasi-random timing of natural disasters to study the connection between public attention to politics and legislators’ support for special interests. We show that when a disaster strikes, the news media reduce coverage of politics in general and of individual legislators in particular, and members of the House of Representatives become significantly more likely to adopt special interest donors’ positions. The evidence implies that politicians are more inclined to take actions benefiting special interests when the public is distracted. More broadly, our findings suggest that attention to politics improves electoral accountability even in an environment with stringent transparency requirements. (JEL D72, L82, Q54)