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特殊利益集团与选民以及注意力的政治经济学

Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention
The Economic Journal · 2024 · Patrick Balles、Ulrich Matter、Alois Stutzer

中文摘要

我们考察美国众议院议员是否在媒体对政治关注度较低的时期更偏向特殊利益集团而非选民。通过分析2005年至2018年的666次唱名表决,我们表明,议员从支持相反立场的集团获得的特殊利益资金越多,其越有可能投票反对本选区偏好的立场。当由于自然灾害等外生新闻事件造成注意力分散、对政治的关注减少时,后一效应显著更大。该效应主要由短期机会主义行为驱动,而非在新闻压力较大时期对争议性表决的短期安排。

Abstract

Abstract We investigate whether US House representatives favour special interest groups over constituents in periods of low media attention to politics. Analysing 666 roll calls from 2005 to 2018, we show that representatives are more likely to vote against their constituency’s preferred position the more special interest money they receive from groups favouring the opposite position. The latter effect is significantly larger when less attention is paid to politics due to distraction by exogenous newsworthy events like natural disasters. The effect is mostly driven by short-term opportunistic behaviour than the short-term scheduling of controversial votes in periods with high news pressure.
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