Journal of the European Economic Association · 2023 · Filipe R. Campante、Davin Chor、Bingjing Li
中文摘要
我们通过考察2010年代中期中国的出口放缓，研究不利经济冲击如何影响强威权体制的政治结果。我们首先使用移位-份额工具变量策略表明，经历更严重出口放缓的地级市见证了罢工事件的显著增加。地级市市委书记随后更有可能被中央政府替换，特别是如果罢工的增加幅度大于经历可比出口放缓的其他地级市。这些模式与我们所构建的一个简单框架相一致，在该框架中，中央政府战略性地利用人事更替决定来激励地方官员在维护社会稳定上的努力，并对其加以筛选以决定留任。与该框架的预测一致，我们发现地方市委书记——特别是职业考量更强的年轻官员——在负面出口冲击后对维护稳定给予了更高重视。这体现在言辞（来自官方讲话的文本分析）和行动（来自公共安全支出与社会支出）两方面。
Abstract
Abstract We study how adverse economic shocks influence political outcomes in strong authoritarian regimes, by examining the export slowdown in China during the mid-2010s. We first show that prefectures that experienced a more severe export slowdown witnessed a significant increase in incidents of labor strikes, using a shift-share instrumental variables strategy. The prefecture party secretary was subsequently more likely to be replaced by the central government, particularly if the rise in strikes was greater than in other prefectures that saw comparable export slowdowns. These patterns are consistent with a simple framework we develop, where the central government makes strategic use of a turnover decision to induce effort from local officials in preserving social stability, and to screen them for retention. In line with the framework’s predictions, we find a heightened emphasis by local party secretaries—particularly younger officials whose career concerns are stronger—on upholding stability following negative export shocks. This is evident in both words (from textual analysis of official speeches) and deeds (from expenditures on public security and social spending).