Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Yunji Choi", "affiliation": ["Yonsei University"]}]
中文摘要
本文探讨医疗服务需求如何对低至 1 美元的共付额作出反应。医疗福利（Medical Benefit, MB）是一项面向低收入群体的医疗保险计划。我利用了这样一个情境：仅对此前享受免费医疗的部分 MB 参保者引入了 1 美元的共付额。这一 1 美元的价格使每月门诊就诊次数减少了 10%。虽然我发现低价值医疗服务（如抗生素的不当使用）有所减少，但对高价值医疗服务（如慢性病患者的用药依从性）的影响微乎其微。研究结果表明，小额共付额有助于缓解潜在的道德风险，同时不牺牲对必要医疗服务的可及性。
Abstract
This paper explores how health care demand responds to a copayment as small as $1. Medical Benefit (MB) is a health insurance plan provided to the low-income group. I exploit a setting where a copayment of $1 was introduced only to a portion of the MB enrollees who previously received free care. The price of $1 reduced monthly outpatient visits by 10 percent. While I find a reduction in low-value care, such as the inappropriate use of antibiotics, I find a negligible effect on high-value care, such as medication adherence for patients with chronic illnesses. The findings suggest that a small copayment can help mitigate potential moral hazard risk while not forgoing access to essential care.