转让定价文档规则与跨国企业行为——来自法国的证据

中文摘要

近年来，越来越多的国家颁布税收规则，要求跨国企业（MNE）记录其企业内部贸易价格，并证明这些价格的设定方式与第三方交易一致。这些规则旨在限制企业通过策略性贸易错误定价和向低税率关联企业转移利润的机会。本文研究这些规则的财政效应与实际效应。研究场景是法国于2010年引入的转让定价（TP）文档规则。利用丰富的企业层面数据，我们发现受影响的跨国企业减少了从法国向外的利润转移，同时也降低了在法国的实际投资。在法国境外，受处理的跨国企业在低税率（但非高税率）集团所在地减少了其实际经济活动。

Abstract

In recent years, a growing number of countries have enacted tax rules that require multinational enterprises (MNEs) to document their intra-firm trade prices and demonstrate that they are set as in third-party trade. The objective of these rules is to limit opportunities for strategic trade mis-pricing and profit shifting to lower-tax affiliates. In this paper, we study the regulations’ fiscal and real effects. The testing ground is the introduction of transfer pricing (TP) documentation rules in France in 2010. Drawing on rich firm-level data, we show that affected MNEs reduced their outward profit shifting from France, while simultaneously lowering real investments in the country. Outside of France, treated MNEs decreased their real economic activity at low-tax (but not at high-tax) group locations.