转让定价文档规则与跨国企业行为——来自法国的证据

Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Sabine Laudage Teles", "affiliation": ["German Institute of Development and Sustainability"]}, {"name": "Nadine Riedel", "affiliation": ["Stadtwerke Münster (Germany)"]}, {"name": "Katharina Schmidt", "affiliation": ["University of Mannheim"]}, {"name": "Kristina Strohmaier", "affiliation": ["University of Duisburg-Essen"]}, {"name": "Johannes Voget", "affiliation": ["University of Mannheim"]}, {"name": "Sophia Wickel", "affiliation": ["Centre for European Economic Research", "University of Mannheim"]}]

中文摘要

近年来，越来越多的国家制定了税收规则，要求跨国企业（MNEs）记录其企业内部贸易价格，并证明这些价格系按独立第三方交易的方式设定。这些规则旨在限制战略性贸易错误定价、以及向低税率关联企业转移利润的空间。本文研究这些监管规则的财政效应与实际效应。检验场景是法国于 2010 年引入的转让定价（TP）文档规则。基于丰富的企业层面数据，我们发现，受影响的跨国企业减少了从法国向外的利润转移，同时降低了在法国境内的实际投资。在法国境外，处理组跨国企业在其集团内低税率（而非高税率）所在地减少了实际经济活动。

Abstract

In recent years, a growing number of countries have enacted tax rules that require multinational enterprises (MNEs) to document their intra-firm trade prices and demonstrate that they are set as in third-party trade. The objective of these rules is to limit opportunities for strategic trade mis-pricing and profit shifting to lower-tax affiliates. In this paper, we study the regulations’ fiscal and real effects. The testing ground is the introduction of transfer pricing (TP) documentation rules in France in 2010. Drawing on rich firm-level data, we show that affected MNEs reduced their outward profit shifting from France, while simultaneously lowering real investments in the country. Outside of France, treated MNEs decreased their real economic activity at low-tax (but not at high-tax) group locations.