产品市场垄断与劳动力市场买方垄断
Product Market Monopolies and Labour Market Monopsonies
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Massimiliano Calì", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Giorgio Presidente", "affiliation": ["Bocconi University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 本文揭示了产品市场监管在劳动力市场中的一种新型外部性。本文从理论和实证两方面表明，产品市场中更高的进入壁垒会转化为雇主更高的劳动力市场势力——该势力以工资压低幅度衡量，即劳动边际产出与工资之比。利用印度尼西亚389个制造业产品市场中投资限制的准外生变异，分析发现，若不存在这些限制，工资压低幅度本应低近10%，工人本应获得其边际产出中更大的一部分。分析支持模型的预测：更少的企业进入是投资限制与工资压低幅度之间正相关关系的主要驱动因素，且在雇主已拥有相当大劳动力市场势力的通勤区，这些限制对工资压低幅度的抬升更为明显。这些限制不影响就业，这与近期基于搜寻摩擦和工资谈判的模型一致，但与经典买方垄断模型不一致。
Abstract
Abstract This paper unveils a novel externality of product market regulation in the labour market. It shows theoretically and empirically that higher barriers to entry in product markets translate into higher employers’ labour market power, measured by the wage markdown—the ratio between the marginal product of labour and the wage. Using quasi-exogenous variation in investment restrictions across 389 manufacturing product markets in Indonesia, the analysis finds that wage markdowns would have been almost 10% lower without restrictions and workers would have earned a larger fraction of their marginal product. The analysis supports the model’s prediction that lower entry is the main driver of the positive relationship between investment restrictions and wage markdowns, and that restrictions increase markdowns more in commuting zones where employers have already substantial labour market power. The restrictions do not affect employment, consistent with recent models based on search frictions and wage bargaining, but not with classical monopsony models.