获取欧盟拨款的选举激励
Electoral Incentives to Obtain EU Grants
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Francisco José Veiga", "affiliation": ["University of Minho"]}, {"name": "Linda Gonçalves Veiga", "affiliation": ["University of Minho"]}, {"name": "Otto H. Swank", "affiliation": ["Erasmus University Rotterdam"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 政治代理模型预测，选举方面的考量会促使政治家努力制定有利于公民的政策。我们利用葡萄牙引入市长任期限制这一契机，考察选举激励如何影响在任者为争取欧盟拨款所付出的努力。我们聚焦于欧盟拨款，是因为获取这些拨款需要付出努力；此外，通过获得欧盟拨款，市长能够为其公民做更多事情。我们关注葡萄牙，是因为它提供了一个准自然实验环境，可用于识别选举激励对努力的因果效应。我们发现，受任期限制的市长获得的欧盟资金比有资格竞选连任的市长少约30%。
Abstract
Abstract Political agency models predict that electoral concerns induce politicians to put effort into making policies that benefit citizens. We exploit the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal to investigate how electoral incentives affect incumbents’ efforts to obtain EU grants. We focus on EU grants because getting them requires effort. Moreover, by obtaining EU grants, mayors can do more for their citizens. We focus on Portugal because it provides a quasi-natural experimental setting to determine the causal effect of electoral incentives on effort. We find that term-limited mayors receive about 30% less EU money than mayors eligible for re-election.