Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2026 · Bo Cowgill、Brandon Freiberg、Evan Penniman Starr
中文摘要
我们在与两家金融公司进行的大型实地实验中研究了劳动者竞业禁止条款。在向短期合同制自由职业招聘人员发出的约14,000份工作邀约中，我们对工资以及竞业禁止条款的存在、显著性和时长进行了随机化（所有合同亦包含保密协议）。移除竞业禁止条款使劳动者在竞争雇主间的流动性增加36%–52%，并使劳动者从两家公司获得的总收入提高12%–17%。我们没有发现任何证据——甚至拒绝了微小效应——表明移除竞业禁止条款会导致机密泄露。我们同样没有发现任何证据表明劳动者为了更高薪酬而选择带有竞业禁止条款的工作。在企业离职后沟通之前，许多劳动者似乎未察觉到竞业禁止条款。该结果与一个关于疏忽和执法不确定性的模型相吻合。
Abstract
Abstract We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes (all contracts also included a nondisclosure agreement). Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36%–52% and raises workers’ total earnings from the two firms by 12%–17%. We find no evidence—rejecting even small effects—that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms’ post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.