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市场势力与拉弗曲线

Market Power and the Laffer Curve
Econometrica · 2018 · Eugenio J. Miravete、Katja Seim、Jeff Thurk

中文摘要

我们研究商品税并刻画了非竞争性市场中的拉弗曲线,即税率与税收收入之间的权衡。这些市场中的定价导致不完全的税负转嫁,且代理人对任何税收变动重新优化其购买和定价决策。我们使用来自宾夕法尼亚州(该州垄断酒精饮料的零售)的详细数据,估计了一个水平差异化产品的需求模型,将消费者的人口统计特征与对烈酒的异质性偏好联系起来。我们发现,在该州当前的税收政策下,烈酒定价过高。酿酒商通过提高批发价格来应对税率的降低,这将该州的收入增加限制在仅相当于完全竞争这一常见假设下预测的增量税收收入的13%。因此,非竞争性企业对税收变动的策略性反应显著地使拉弗曲线变平。

Abstract

We study commodity taxation and characterize the Laffer curve, a trade-off between tax rates and revenue, in noncompetitive markets. Pricing in these markets leads to incomplete tax pass-through and agents re-optimize their purchase and pricing decisions in response to any tax change. We use detailed data from Pennsylvania, a state that monopolizes retail sales of alcoholic beverages, to estimate a model of demand for horizontally differentiated products that ties consumers' demographic characteristics to heterogeneous preferences for spirits. We find that under the state's current tax policy, spirits are overpriced. Distillers respond to decreases in the tax rate by increasing wholesale prices, which limits the state's revenue gain to only 13% of the incremental tax revenue predicted under the common assumption of perfect competition. The strategic response of noncompetitive firms to changes in taxation therefore flattens the Laffer curve significantly.
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