Review of Economic Studies · 2017 · Renato Gomes、Jean‐Marie Lozachmeur、Alessandro Massi Pavan
中文摘要
我们在一个Roy模型中研究非线性所得税，其中行为人的生产率具有部门特定性。我们证明，当所得税可以按部门设定时，Diamond-Mirrlees定理（即次优结果应实现生产效率）不再成立：通过将部分行为人配置到其生产率最低的部门，社会福利（无论是罗尔斯式还是加权功利主义式）都可以得到提高。通过牺牲生产效率，规划者在总产出上承受二阶损失，但在再分配的信息成本上获得一阶降低。当政府受限于统一的所得税税率表时，只要销售税可以按部门设定，同样的结论依然成立。在后一种情形下，我们的结果还意味着Atkinson-Stiglitz定理（该定理认为，当消费与闲暇的偏好可分离时——正如本文经济中那样——次优结果可以通过零销售税来实现）不再成立。
Abstract
We study nonlinear income taxation in a Roy model in which agents’ productivity is sector-specific. We show that when income taxes can be sector-specific, the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem (according to which the second-best displays production efficiency) fails: social welfare (be it Rawlsian or Weighed Utilitarian) can be increased by assigning some agents to their least productive sector. By sacrificing production efficiency, the planner incurs second-order losses in total output, but obtains a first-order reduction in the informational costs of redistribution. The same result obtains when the government is constrained to a uniform income tax schedule, as long as sales taxes can be made sector-specific. In this latter case, our result also implies failure of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem (according to which, when preferences over consumption and leisure are separable, as they are in our economy, the second-best can be implemented with zero sales taxes).