NBER Working Papers · 2026 · Bradley T. Shapiro、Sara Drango、Sarah Moshary
中文摘要
限制枪支销售的政策面临巨大的政治反对和宪法约束。本文中，我们追问：诱导潜在手枪购买者选择致死性较低的替代品需要付出多高的成本。我们将陈述性选择实验与枪支选择的行为模型相结合，估计诱导消费者从手枪转向长枪或不购买枪支所需的补偿支付。随后，我们将这些支付与由此带来的死亡率收益进行比较。我们发现存在可观的贸易收益：许多潜在手枪购买者只需相对较少的补偿便愿意转换，针对性的补偿能够以远低于传统统计生命价值估计值的社会成本避免凶杀。然而，这些收益能在多大程度上通过补偿得以实现，取决于州政府是否掌握关于哪些消费者会改变其选择以及以何种价格改变的信息。缺乏这一信息时，统一补贴会向那些无论如何都会选择替代品的消费者支付补偿，并对那些愿意以更低补偿转换的消费者过度补偿，从而急剧增加政府支出并降低补偿的最优规模。
Abstract
Policies restricting gun sales face substantial political opposition and constitutional constraints. In this paper, we ask how costly it would be to induce potential hand-gun buyers to choose less lethal alternatives. Pairing stated-choice experiments with a behavioral model of firearm choice, we estimate the payments required to induce substitution away from handguns toward long guns or no gun purchase. We then compare these payments with the resulting mortality benefits. We find substantial gains from trade: many prospective handgun buyers require relatively little compensation to switch and targeted compensation can avert homicides at a social cost well below conventional estimates of the value of a statistical life. The extent to which these gains can be realized through compensation, however, depends on the state’s information about which consumers would change their choices and at what price. Without this information, uniform subsidies pay consumers who would choose an alternative anyway and overcompensate those willing to switch for less, sharply increasing government expenditure and reducing the optimal scale of compensation.