中文摘要
本文研究中国如何将进入公开股权市场的机会作为产业政策工具。我们发现, 政策扶持地位 (而非行业托宾 Q) 能够预测 IPO 活动, 这与美国形成对比。这一效应在经济规模上十分可观: 我们的估计意味着, 2002 年至 2022 年间, 受扶持行业的 IPO 数量比非受扶持行业多 287%, IPO 募资额高 148%。我们构建了一个框架来解释这些发现: 政府决定各行业可获得的上市机会数量, 而市场力量则基于企业基本面决定哪些企业获得这些机会。与我们的框架相一致, 政策扶持同样预示着一个在上市后仍持续存在的估值溢价。
Abstract
This paper studies how China uses access to public equity markets as an instrument of industrial policy. We find that policy-favored status, rather than industry Tobin's Q, predicts IPO activity, in contrast to the United States. The effect is economically large: our estimates imply that favored industries had 287% more IPOs and 148% higher IPO proceeds than non-favored industries over 2002 to 2022. We develop a framework to interpret these findings: the government shapes the number of listing opportunities available across industries, while market forces determine which firms obtain these opportunities based on firm fundamentals. Consistent with our framework, policy favor also predicts a valuation premium which persists after listing.